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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the eﬀect of the New York City school accountability grades that existed from 
 
2006-2013 on the residential property market.  Test scores have normally been used as a measure of 
 
school quality in estimating the eﬀect of school quality in the residential property market while work on 
 
the eﬀect of accountability measures has been limited. This paper shows that test scores had a strong 
 
positive eﬀect on New York City residential property market. Grades by themselves are also found to 
 
have some influence on residential property market, but the inclusion of test scores along with grades 
 
diminishes the strength of their eﬀect. 
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I. Introduction
Over the past 15 years school accountability has been a leading movement within educational reform
that has sought to evaluate and hold accountable the performance of schools. The movement gained promi-
nence with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001 under the Bush Administration
and continued under the Obama administration with the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). Many school
accountability programs were already in place prior to NCLB across states and cities, and after its implemen-
tation some programs expanded beyond the provisions NCLB set in place. Broadly, the school accountability
movement can be deﬁned by its use of data-based methods to evaluate schools in order to improve student
performance.
The consequences of school accountability may extend beyond its goal of improving student performance
as diﬀerent agents respond to new information assessing school performance. In particular homebuyers may
respond to accountability programs as a measure of school quality and factor it into their property market
decisions. Extensive work has been done showing that school quality is capitalized into property prices,
with test scores typically being the school quality measure, but work assessing how homebuyers respond to
accountability programs has been limited.
In New York City Michael Bloomberg implemented a school accountability program that functioned
independently of NCLB. The program evaluated schools through yearly progress reports and lasted from
2006-2013. The progress reports gave categorical A-F grades based oﬀ a continuous metric that evaluated
school performance. As in other accountability programs, the progress reports pressured poor performing
schools to improve and oﬀered incentives to those that performed well.
This paper links the school accountability literature with the literature on valuation of school quality in
the New York City residential property market. The primary goal is to understand if accountability grades
were capitalized into the residential property market alongside school test scores. Following previous work
this paper validates that test scores were capitalized into the residential property market in New York City
through a hedonic regression design. The results continue to hold in a boundary discontinuity design, but
the magnitude of the eﬀect does not diminish as in previous work. Unlike most previous work this paper
also shows that accountability grades have some inﬂuence on the property market separate from just test
scores.
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II. Background
A. NYC Accountability Program and the Property Market
Under the Bloomberg Administration New York City implemented an extensive school accountability
progam put in place by Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) Joel Klein.
Klein was the ﬁrst Chancellor following the reorganization of the NYCDOE that gave the mayor direct
control over the department. This gave Klein greater scope than previous chancellors in pushing through
his initiatives. Klein gave greater autonomy to schools, irrespective of their past performance, while holding
schools accountable for their performance. Schools were assessed through yearly progress reports that as-
signed A-F grades evaluating school performance. Schools that recieved low accountability grades, especially
persistently low grades, were threatened with closure and changes in personnel.
The A-F grades were based on a continuous score that was determined by three main factors: school
environment, student performance, and student progress. The number of points and the exact grading criteria
for each factor changed slightly over time, but after the ﬁrst year 15 points were for school environment,
25 points for student performance and 60 points for student progress. School Environment was derived
from data on student attendance, school safety, and surveys from parents, teachers and students. Student
performance was measured by Math and English test scores. Student progess was based on changes in
student proﬁency from the previous year. Scores within these factors were also allocated on the basis of a
peer index that compared schools with similar characteristics.
Further, schools earned additional credit for “exemplary student progress” in particular student subgroups.
A numeric cutoﬀ for letter grades was initially set, but starting in the 2009-2010 school year grades were
distributed based on the proportion of school types that fell within overall score percentiles for four school
types: High School, K-8, Elementary, and Middle. Schools in the 75th percentile were assigned an A, in
the 40th B, 15th C, 5th D and the rest were assigned an F. In practice there were exceptions, for example
in 2009-2010 if a school received a B in the previous year the lowest grade it could receive was a D, this
made the actual distribution of grades not align with the percentiles. In 2010-11 the cut scores were changed
slightly with schools in the 75th percentile receiving an A, 40th B, 10th C, 3rd D and the rest F. This cut
oﬀ was used for the last three years of the program. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of grades over the
full span of the program for all schools except high schools.
The structure of the accountability system, by putting more weight on the student progress metric
as opposed to student performance, meant that poor performing schools could receive high grades if they
made signiﬁcant progress. Schools that received As or Bs in some cases were even declared failing under
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NCLB, which focused on absolute standards of performance. Figure 1 shows that in the 2010-2011 school
year there was a strong relationship between the continous score schools received, which the grades were
derived from, and their test scores, but there were some large outliers.1 Further, many schools perceived
as high quality by parents and the media did not perform well in the ﬁrst year of the program as reported
in the New York Times: “Several esteemed elementary schools that middle-class parents often factor in to
their real estate decisions - including Public School 6 on the Upper East Side, P.S. 87 on the Upper West
Side, P.S. 234 in TriBeCa and P.S. 321 in Park Slope, Brooklyn, - received B’s. Other popular schools fared
worse. P.S. 154 in Windsor Terrace, Brooklyn, received a D, as did Central Park East I in Harlem.”2 Tables
2-3 show that between years grades were strongly correlated as over 50% of schools that received an A for
the 2010-2011 school year received an A in the previous year and in the subsequent year. Nonetheless, there
was considerable variability as over 30% of schools that received a D for 2010-2011 received an A or B in the
previous year while almost 25% of D schools received an A in the next year.
In New York City most elementary and middle school students are assigned to one public school that is
determined by the school district and school zone where their residential address is located The NYCDOE
has 32 school districts for administrating schools with individual zones within districts that determine which
school a student attends. Out of the 32 school districts three are choice districts with no zoned school.
In addition, there are a few zones across the districts that have more than one zoned school, but the vast
majority of students have only one public school for their zone. Zones are very precise with students on
opposite sides of a street potentially attending diﬀerent schools. Hence, parents are often very particular
about where they choose to live, as one parent reported they had to make sure of the side of a street on
which their apartment was located. 3. Zones are mostly stable over time, but new zones are created usually
to avoid overcrowding. Attempts to change school zones often meet sharp opposition from parents who chose
properties based on zoned schools.4
B. Literature Review
Previous work on school accountability programs focused on the eﬀects of the accountability measures
on test scores in subsequent years using an RDD design looking at eﬀects along the accountability measure
1This holds for other years as well. 2010-2011 is primarily used here and going forward as it captures a distribution of schools
very close to the set grade cut-oﬀs, and in the preceding and subsequent year grades were similarly distributed unlike in early
years of the program.
2See article for reporting on the ﬁrst year of the program in general http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/education/
06reportcards.html
3See article for anecdotes of parents looking for property based on school quality in New York City http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/05/05/realestate/your-address-as-get-into-school-card.html
4See https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/nyregion/rezoning-plan-for-schools-on-upper-west-side-is-approved-after-bitter-fight.
html and https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/nyregion/ps-191-ps-199-ps-452-rezoning-schools-manhattan.html for recent
opposition to rezoning on the Upper West Side
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cutoﬀs. Notably Rockoﬀ and Turner (2010) and Cowen and Winters (2012) looked at the eﬀects of the
accountability grades in New York City. Rockoﬀ and Turner (2010) found that schools that recieved D
and F grades in the ﬁrst year of the program saw signiﬁgant improvements in test scores in the susquent
year. Cowen and Winters (2012) showed that the positive eﬀects of D and F grades persisted in subsequent
years, but the magntiude of the eﬀects diminished. Figlio and Loeb (2011) provide a concise summary of the
accountability rationale, and its eﬀects on school performance and student outcomes. They concluded that
test scores typically improve following the implemenation of an accountability program, but it is unclear if
the gains are long lasting, the nature of the exact mechanisms, and if the gains are fully legitimate or gamed.
Work has also branched out to look at the eﬀect of accountability programs on school policies Rouse et al.
(2013), income and post secondary attainment Deming et al. (2016), teacher turnover Dizon-Ross (2017)
among others.
The literature on property prices and school quality spans decades. Black and Machin (2011) and Nguyen-
Hoang and Yinger (2011) provide comprehensive surveys of the literature from early hedonic models to more
recent work using boundary discontinuity designs (BDD), instrumental variables, diﬀerence in diﬀerences
(DID) and combined methods with work using recent methods ﬁnding that a standard deviation increase
in test scores is associated with a 2-5% increase in property prices. The initial literature used hedonic
regression designs to evaluate the eﬀect, but concerns with the endogenity between school quality and
property prices were common as hedonic models were unable to fully control for unobserved neighborhood
eﬀects. Black (1999) was ﬁrst able to convincingly alleviate the issue a through a BDD. The design
assumes that properties arbitrarily close to a school zone boundary have essentially the same characteristics
with the diﬀerence between property values being the quality of the school to which the property is zoned.
If the assumption holds an unbiased estimate of the eﬀect of school quality, as determined by school test
scores, on property prices can be attained. Black’s paper, and those that that followed using the same
design, showed school quality had smaller eﬀects on property values than conventional hedonic estimates.
Bayer, Ferreira, McMillan (2007) extended such work looking at sorting along school zone boundaries by
incorporating a BDD in a structural model of heterogeneous sorting showing that controlling for household
characteristics the eﬀect of school quality are about 50% lower. In addition Chiodo et al. (2010) found
school quality had nonlinear eﬀects on the property market with the price premium rising as school quality
increased.
School quality in most work was assessed by looking at average test scores. Some work has looked at
whether test scores of diﬀerent types of students are valued diﬀerently. Clapp et al. (2008) and Kane et al.
(2003) found evidence that parents may discount test scores of Hispanic and Black students. Brasington and
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Haurin (2006) found that value-added measures of school quality are not accounted for in property prices,
and Schwartz et al. (2014) found that the introduction of school choice in New York City decreased the
importance of school quality on prices. Regardless of method the literature thus far has shown that homebuy-
ers consistently factored in school quality in resdiental property market decisions with newer identiﬁcation
methods typically showing smaller eﬀects than traditional hedonic methods.
There has been limited work linking the two literatures. Most notably Figlio and Lucas (2004) studied
the eﬀects of the Florida accountability program on property prices. The Florida program was similar to
the NYC program in that it allocated grades A-F on a composite score with penalties given to persistently
under performing schools. They found that grades along with test scores had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on residential
property prices in the year after the release of the grades. In subsequent years they found the eﬀects of the
grades tapered oﬀ. Hart and Figlio (2015) found that aﬄuent educated parents were more responsive to
high accountability grades in the Florida program as they were were more likely to move kindergarten aged
children into schools that received A or B grades. Kane et al. (2003) and Martinez (2010) looked at the
eﬀects of the accountability program in North Carolina that used a categorical rating system that places
schools into categories based oﬀ absolute test scores and value-added measures. Kane et al. (2003) failed to
ﬁnd signiﬁcant results of any of the categories on property prices, while Martinez (2010), using a later data
set, found signiﬁcant eﬀects on categorical measures that rated schools highly.
Most recently, Imberman and Lovheim (2016) looked at the eﬀects of the release of value-added ranking
of teachers in Los Angles on property sales. They failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁgant eﬀect of the teacher rankings
on property prices using a DID strategy, but using a BDD they found that school quality, as measured by
test scores, was capitalized in the property market. The reasons behind the failure to capitalize value-added
measure is unclear. The authors point to the possibility that value-added measures are hard to interpret
and that their eﬃcacy is controversial. In addition they cite Bergman and Hill (2015), who also assessed the
Los Angles program and found that students with high test scores sorted into classrooms with highly rated
teachers in the schools where they were enrolled. This suggests that there was a response to the teacher
ranking on a low-cost margin, as students sorted to higher ranked teachers within schools, as opposed to the
higher cost of physically moving to another school with higher ranked teachers.
Overall, the literature indicates that whether the New York City school accountability grades were
capitalized in the resdiental property market is dependant on how homebuyers chose to interpret the grades.
If they believed in the eﬃcacy of the grades it is plausible that they were capitalized along with test scores,
although it is unclear if the eﬀects peresited over time as the intial shock of the grades may have dissipated.
It is also possible that homebuyers didn’t believe in the eﬃcacy of the grades and measured school quality
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mainly through test scores.
III. Methodology
This paper uses two empirical strategies to estimate the eﬀects of accountability grades and test scores
on the residential property market. First, hedonic regression is used to estimate the eﬀect of accountability
grades and test scores. Following Rosen (1974), hedonic regression assumes an inelastic supply of housing
with heterogeneous consumers. Hedonic regression models the equilibrium where sales price is determined
by all characteristics that matter to the marginal consumer for their decision to purchase property. The
basic equation used to assess how school quality is accounted for is below:
(1)ln(Pi,z,t,n) = α+Xi + Zi,n + Γi,z,t−1 + ei,z,t,n
ln(Pi,z,t,n) is the log price of property i sold in school zone z, time t and neighborhood n
Xi is a vector of ﬁxed housing characteristics for property i
Zi,n is a vector of neighborhood characteristics for property i in neighborhood n
Γi,z,t−1 is the school quality measure for property i in school zone z from the previous year’s accountability
grades, and the scores from which they were derived; or test scores
ei,z,t,n is the error term
The biggest concern with hedonic estimation is omitted variable bias and the diﬃculty of capturing
measures that may be relevant to the property market across school zones. This problem is mitigated through
Zi,n which includes census block and track controls. Nonetheless, as previous literature has shown estimates
of school quality eﬀects through the hedonic method should be interpreted as an upper bound estimate.
The limitations of the hedonic method make it dependent on data availability and the variables chosen.
Hence, the second strategy uses a boundary discontinuity design (BDD) where a boundary dummy variable
Kb is added for properties within a certain distance of a school zone boundary. Under this design it is assumed
that any uncontrolled neighborhood characteristics that might inﬂuence property prices should disappear as
the distance band is narrowed. Nonetheless, to account for the possibility of sorting, neighborhood controls
are still employed.
(2)ln(Pi,z,t,n,b) = α+Xi,b +Kb + Zi,n,b + Γi,z,b,t−1 + ei,z,t,n,b
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The BDD used in this paper, however is imperfect and may give a ﬂawed estimate. In particular,
unlike Black(1999) and most previous research that use a BDD, this paper does not account for non-natural
boundaries. For example, properties close to a boundary like Central Park or the Hudson River instead of
another school zone boundary were not excluded. Given this limitation BDD results in this paper should be
interpreted with caution.
IV. Data Summary
A. Data Sources
To understand the eﬀects of the accountability grades on property prices, data was drawn from multiple
sources. Accountability, test score and demographic data for elementary-grade schools was obtained from
the NYCDOE. Average math and English test scores for all students in each school were combined scores
standardized for each school year.5 Elementary school zone data was obtained from the NYC Open Data
website. Each year’s elementary school zones were joined with the previous year’s school-level data by a
unique District Borough Number (DBN) identiﬁer given to each school. School zone data is only publicly
available going back to 2009-2010. As a result the earliest accountability data is from 2008-2009 with the
ﬁrst two years of the accountability data excluded.
Property sales data were drawn from the New York City Department of Finance (DOF) containing
data on property characteristics, sale price, sale date, and building class. In addition there was data on the
borough, tax lot and block used to identify the location of the properties. The property sales data was then
joined with the New York City Department of City Planning’s PLUTO dataset that contains geo coordinates
of every property in the city along with more detailed information on property characteristics. The PLUTO
data set is released every 6 months, changing over time as new properties appear or disappear. To ensure
all properties were matched with the relevant variables the sales data was assigned to the speciﬁc PLUTO
data set based on the property’s sales date. Only residential properties classiﬁed as family homes, condos
and co-ops were used. The vast majority of properties in the sales data were matched merging properties
by tax lot, block and borough.6 Certain properties, notably condos, are classiﬁed slightly diﬀerently in the
two data sets as each unit in a building is deﬁned as a separate tax lot by the DOF, but PLUTO assigned
tax lots based on the whole building. As a result for condos the PLUTO and the property sales data were
joined by exact address, which resulted in approximately 40% of sold properties being matched. In order to
5School grades encompassing students varied by the exact school type as some schools zoned to elementary school zones had
students up to grade 12 while other schools only had a handful of grades e.g. 3-5, but only students between grades 3-8 were
tested and included in average test scores
6For properties classiﬁed as family dwellings 99% were matched
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remove outliers, properties that sold for less than $10,000 or more than $3 million were excluded.7
Sold properties were then assigned to the speciﬁc school zone in which they were located based on the
sale year and the release of the accountability grades. Accountability grades were released in late September
so all property sold after the release of the grades were aligned with that school year’s school zone until the
release of the next year’s accountability grades (e.g. the accountability grades for the 2011-2012 school year
were released in late September 2012. All property sold after October was then matched to the school zone
where the property was located for the 2012-2013 school year until the release of the 2012-2013 accountability
grades in September 2013. Lastly, 2010 census data were matched to PLUTO data based on the census tract
and census block the properties were located in.
B. Summary Statistics
Tables 4-8 show the characteristics of schools, properties and the neighborhood properties were sold
in based on the grades schools received in the 2010-2011 school year. Properties sold in zones with high
accountability grades had schools that were associated with higher test scores, and higher concentrations of
white and Asian students. Properties sold in zones with high accountability grades were also in census blocks
that had older and whiter populations, whereas properties sold in zones with low accountability grades had
schools with higher concentrations of black and Hispanic students, lower test scores and the properties were
in census blocks that had more black and younger populations. There is no discernible diﬀerence in the
concentration of White, Hispanic or English-language learner students across the grades. As expected, given
the distribution of grades schools received in 2010-2011, there were relatively few sold properties associated
with D or F schools compared to A,B and C schools. Further, prices tended to be higher for schools that
received better grades with the exception of properties sold in areas with C and F grade schools although
this does not control for any property characteristics.
Figure 2 conﬁrms, as expected, that schools with higher test scores were associated with higher property
prices. Figure 3 illustrates that there appears to be some, albeit weak, relationship between property prices
and accountability grades.8
Map 1 illustrates the properties sold between October 2011 and October 2012 in the 2011-2012
elementary school zones after the release of grades for the 2010-2011 school year in late September 2011.
The map illustrates that properties from across the city are captured, with the exception of districts with
7Properties in the DOF data set that had a listed sale price of 0 were typically properties transferred between relatives or
inheritances. Some of the maximum sale prices were very high (to be expected given the high end of the property market in
New York City) and were therefore excluded
8For comparability only single family homes property types were included in the ﬁgures
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choice schools, and that there is a diverse distribution of grades throughout the city. Map 2 highlights a
speciﬁc area in Brooklyn showing a signiﬁcant variation in the grades schools received within a relatively
small geographic area. Map 3 presents another area in Brooklyn where only properties within .025 miles, or
44 yards, of a school zone boundary are included showing how close some properties are to being zoned to
schools with diﬀerent accountability grades.
V. Results
A. Hedonic Regression
Table 9 presents hedonic regression estimates with test scores as the measure of school quality for the
full time span of available data using linear and nonlinear speciﬁcations. The regressions include housing
characteristics such as the year built, gross square feet, and year altered. In addition, there are neighborhood
characteristics from 2010 census blocks for each property including racial characteristics, median age, and
average family size. As expected test scores are consistently capitalized into property prices. Test scores
are standardized so that in Table 9 a one standard deviation increase in test scores can be interpreted
as increasing property prices by 7.7% using a linear speciﬁcation. The estimate is higher than what has
generally been reported in the literature indicating there may be some uncontrolled factors correlated with
test scores.
Column 2 adds a second-order polynomial for test scores. In the regression to eliminate negative
standardized scores, 3.5 is added to all the standardized scores. The signiﬁcance of the squared test score
indicates that there is a nonlinear relationship between test scores and property prices. Higher order polyno-
mials on test scores are also used, but didn’t provide any more interpretative results or signiﬁcantly increase
the R2 coeﬃcient. Column 3 further conﬁrms a nonlinear relationship as test scores are put into quartiles.
No signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for schools in the 2nd quartile relative to the ﬁrst, but the 3rd and 4th quartiles
are highly signiﬁcant with the 4th quartile associated with 14.2% higher property prices relative to schools
in the ﬁrst quartile.The results in columns 2 and 3 suggest that schools with below average test scores do
not have a large inﬂuence on the residential property market, but schools with above average test scores
were highly valued at an increasing rate. The nonlinear results are similar to those found in Chiodo et al.
(2010) that found that properties associated with schools with test scores above the median commanded a
price premium higher than expected under a linear speciﬁcation.
To see if accountability grades by themselves are capitalized Table 10 uses accountability grades as the
measure of school quality across all years using the same controls as in Table 9. The eﬀects of grades B-F
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are reported relative to the eﬀect of receiving an A grade. Therefore, a B grade is associated with a 3.3%
decrease in property prices relative to an A grade. In the table all the grades are highly signiﬁcant at 1%
with each lower grade associated with a larger decrease in property prices over the previous grade.
Table 11 looks at the eﬀects along each year to see if eﬀects varied over time. Each column in the
table shows the eﬀect of the previous year’s accountability grades on property prices in the following year.
For example, column one labeled 2009-2010 shows the eﬀect of 2008-2009 accountability grades on sales in
2009-2010. 9 The results show heterogeneity in the magnitude of the eﬀects with a B grade associated with
16.1% lower property prices in 2011-2012, but only 2.4% lower in the next year, although the results are
similar to those in Table 9 with grades being capitalized as expected in most years and lower grades penalized
increasingly more with each lower grade. Most of the grades are also highly signiﬁcant at 1%. The exception
to these results is in 2010-2011 where there are no signiﬁcant results, although the grade coeﬃcients exhibit
their expected signs.
Given the strong correlation between test scores and accountability grades, the association between
property prices and property sales is to be expected. Table 12 looks at whether the grades continued to
be capitalized into property prices when test scores are included. In each of the speciﬁcations in Table 12
the magnitude of the eﬀect decreases with signiﬁcance disappearing for many of the grades. B grades hold
strong signiﬁcance across the speciﬁcations. In particular they are signiﬁcant at 1% and associated with a 2%
decrease in property prices relative to A grades in the speciﬁcation with quartile test scores. Test scores also
show a slightly stronger eﬀect with a one standard deviation increase in test scores now increasing property
prices by 8.5% in the linear speciﬁcation while a school in the fourth quartile has property prices 15.1%
higher relative to those in the ﬁrst quartile.
Table 13 looks along each of the years including linear test scores to ease interpretation of the test score
results. Results with squared and quartile test scores are also estimated, but do not generate signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent results for the grade variables. As in the results that only used grades, Table 13 shows evidence of
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the eﬀects over time. Lower grades still hold strong and signiﬁcant results
for most of the grade coeﬃcients. Results for 2010-2011 and 2013-2014, however, hold no signiﬁcance for
the expected signs, with F grades oddly signiﬁcant and positive at the 10% level in 2013-2014. To see if
including the accountability grades added explanatory power to the hedonic model with just test scores, an
F-test was performed on each of the speciﬁcations with all speciﬁcations highly signiﬁcant with F statistics
over 10. This indicates that grades did provide some information that inﬂuenced the residential property
9There were no properties associated with F schools in 2008-2009 as a result the F the grade coeﬃcient is not reported in
2009-2010
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market.
Unlike in Figlio and Lucas (2004) there is no evidence of the grade eﬀects diminishing over time
although the eﬀects of the program’s ﬁrst two years are not estimated. Instead the diﬀerent magnitudes of
the grade eﬀects, both in results with and without test scores, points to the possibility that the grades are
interpreted diﬀerently each year. It’s possible given the changing distribution of the grades in the ﬁrst few
years of the program inﬂuenced homebuyers’ beliefs in the credibility of the grades or their belief in their
eﬃcacy waxed and waned over time. There may a be factors correlated with the grades in particular years
that are uncontrolled for.
B. BDD
Given the known biases associated with hedonic estimation, it is expected under the BDD that as the
sample is diminished to include properties closer to the zone boundary it should be less likely that there
are any diﬀerences other than school quality on opposite side of a boundary. Prior literature has typically
shown that the magnitude of the school quality eﬀect diminishes as the distance band is narrowed. Table
14 presents the results of applying the BDD using test scores. Test scores continue to be highly signiﬁcant
further validating that they are capitalized, but contrary to expected results the magnitude of test scores
does not decrease. The peculiar results of the BDD are likely linked to the ﬂawed design attempted as
already discussed.
Table 15 looks at the eﬀect of accountability grades for all years with all grades holding their expected
eﬀect and tending to be signiﬁcant at .1 miles from the boundary. As the band is narrowed, however, the
signiﬁcance disappears except for F grades. Along each year in Table 16 the results are mixed although for
2011-2012 the grades continue to be highly signiﬁcant. Notably the eﬀect of F grades in the last three years
of the program are signiﬁcant at 1% and display very large eﬀects with an F grade in 2012-2013 associated
with a 41% decrease in property prices relative to an A grade. These eﬀects are much larger than the F
grade eﬀects found in Table 11 which had hedonic estimates of just grades.
Tables 17 and 18 add test scores for results in all years and along each year. In Table 17 grade coeﬃcients
are often positive or show no signiﬁcance although F grades are still highly negative and signiﬁcant at the
.025 boundary. Using nonlinear test scores on each of the distance bands was also attempted, but there was
no signiﬁcant change in the grade coeﬃcients.
Table 18 shows similar results although grades are now typically negative exhibiting some signiﬁcance
especially in 2011-2012, which continues to be highly signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcance of F grades disappears
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in the last year, but continues to be highly and large in the two previous years with larger negative results
than in the hedonic estimate. The continued signiﬁcance of the F grades may indicate that when faced
with the choice between a property zoned with an F school relative to any other school, just about literally,
across the street buyers consistently paid more for the alternative. An F-Test was again conducted across
the speciﬁcations with F statistic over 10 for all years at the .1 band, but diminishing to just 6 at .05 and
3.4 at.025. Across each of the years only 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 continue to be highly signiﬁcant with
F-statistics over 7 and 11 respectively.
As in the hedonic estimates there is no evidence of the grades having a diminishing eﬀect over time
with the magnitude and signiﬁcance of eﬀects varying over time.
V. Conclusion
Letter grades have often been used in accountability programs to act as an easily interpretable measure
of school quality for the public to digest. In New York as Rockoﬀ and Turner (2010) and Cowen and Winters
(2012) have shown accountability grades helped improve the performance of low performing schools. The
results presented here indicate that the residential property market in New York City also responds to school
quality measures with test scores consistently and strongly capitalized. The evidence for whether account-
ability grades are capitalized isn’t as robust, but accountability grades provide at least some explanatory
power. The fact that there is any signiﬁcance is surprising given that the program had been in place for a
number of years and that in the research by Figlio and Lucas (2004) the eﬀect of grades faded over time.
Although this paper was unable to look at the ﬁrst two years of the accountability program there is evidence
that the eﬀects of the program varied over time perhaps being dependent on the changing structure of the
grades and beliefs in the reliability of the grades. The sudden change in the distribution of the grades, from
over 80% of schools earning As in 2008-2009 to a cap around 25% in subsequent years, may have changed
parents beliefs in the validity of the grades as a measure of school quality, as parents assessing the grades
from 2010-2011 may have found them credible as the set cut-oﬀ grade for schools persisted over two years
leading them to use the grades in property decisions.
There are some confounding factors that can be explored. Most notably is what eﬀect the introduction
of charter schools, which grew substantially over this period, have on how zoned public schools. Previous
work from Schwartz et al. (2014) has already identiﬁed that choice schools in New York City delinked the
previous eﬀect that school quality had on local zoned schools. In addition a BDD design that corrects for
non-natural boundaries could reveal results more in line with the literature showing the magnitude of school
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quality eﬀects diminishing as the boundary band is narrowed.
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Figure 1: 2010−2011 Test Scores and Accountability Grades
Notes: Standardized Average test scores for all students in each school is used
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Figure 2: 2010−2011 Test Scores and 2011−2012 Log Property Sales
Notes: Only single family homes property types are included
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Figure 3: 2010−2011 Accountability Grades and 2011−2012 Log Property Sales
Notes: Only single family homes property types are included
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Map 1: 2010-2011 Accountability Grades and 2011-2012 Properties sold in 2011-2012 School
Zones
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Map 2: 2010-2011 Accountability Grades and 2011-2012 Properties sold in 2011-2012 School
Zones Brooklyn
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Map 3: 2010-2011 Accountability Grades and 2011-2012 Properties sold in 2011-2012 School
Zones Brooklyn .025 miles from Boundary
Tables
Table 1: Distribution of Accountability Grades 2006-2013
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 Cutoﬀ
A 23.24 37.34 84.33 25.63 24.54 23.37 25.62 25
B 38.12 41.07 13.47 35.38 35.51 35.58 35.31 35
C 26.55 15.44 1.70 34.89 30.80 32.31 31.45 30
D 8.57 4.64 0.40 3.70 6.54 6.73 5.64 5
F 3.51 1.51 0.10 0.39 2.60 2.02 1.98 5
Notes: The cutoﬀ was set in 2009-2010
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Table 2: 2010-2011 vs 2009-2010 School Accountability Grades
A B C D F
A 50.19 24.03 8.29 3.12 0
B 35.25 38.12 32.86 28.12 0
C 12.64 32.32 42.86 34.38 50
D 1.92 4.42 11.43 18.75 0
F 0 1.10 4.57 15.62 50
Notes: X Axis: 2010-2011 Y Axis: 2009-2010
Table 3: 2010-2011 vs 2011-2012 School Accountability Grade
A B C D F
A 52.52 23.84 10.98 4.35 0
B 30.67 43.56 35.98 20.29 20
C 13.03 27.40 41.77 56.52 60
D 2.94 3.56 9.45 14.49 10
F 0.84 1.64 1.83 4.35 10
Notes: X Axis: 2011-2011 Y axis: 2011-2012
Table 4: A School Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Standardized English Test Score 8,680 1.327 0.687 −0.950 2.813
Standardized Math Test Score 8,680 1.335 0.623 −0.750 2.586
English Language Learners Percent 8,680 11.965 11.059 0.100 60.900
Special Education Percent 8,680 14.202 5.270 4.600 42.200
Asian Percent 8,680 28.345 22.929 0.000 93.300
Black Percent 8,680 11.457 19.503 0.200 96.400
Hispanic Percent 8,680 24.631 18.751 2.400 93.700
White Percent 8,680 32.910 24.291 0.000 81.900
Sale Price 8,680 591,249.300 475,536.500 10,235 2,995,000
Census Median Age 8,680 40.536 8.914 11.700 80.900
Percent Occupied Housing Units 8,680 0.907 0.071 0.352 0.996
Census Percent White 8,680 0.615 0.261 0.004 0.998
Census Percent Black 8,680 0.088 0.184 0.000 0.975
Census Percent Asian 8,680 0.205 0.194 0.000 0.957
Notes: 2010 census, 2010-2011 school data, and 2011-2012 property sales data used.
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Table 5: B School Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Standardized English Test Score 9,627 0.814 0.646 −0.867 2.311
Standardized Math Test Score 9,627 0.729 0.611 −0.865 1.953
English Language Learners Percent 9,627 11.660 10.076 0.800 53.500
Special Education Percent 9,627 14.077 4.076 5.700 33.400
Asian Percent 9,627 16.684 17.574 0.000 70.000
Black Percent 9,627 22.123 28.499 0.200 95.700
Hispanic Percent 9,627 27.871 20.069 0.700 95.500
White Percent 9,627 32.164 27.419 0.100 93.200
Sale Price 9,627 476,937.700 361,005.800 11,250 2,920,758
Census Median Age 9,627 39.291 6.795 12.300 75.500
Percent Occupied Housing Units 9,627 0.909 0.087 0.373 1.000
Census Percent White 9,627 0.564 0.314 0.002 0.993
Census Percent Black 9,627 0.196 0.289 0.000 0.975
Census Percent Asian 9,627 0.124 0.141 0.000 0.915
Notes: 2010 census, 2010-2011 school data, and 2011-2012 property sales data used.
Table 6: C School Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Standardized English Test Score 8,395 0.552 0.753 −1.118 1.977
Standardized Math Test Score 8,395 0.399 0.694 −1.325 1.551
English Language Learners Percent 8,395 10.545 8.980 0.500 62.800
Special Education Percent 8,395 15.208 4.663 5.200 39.400
Asian Percent 8,395 12.021 15.577 0.000 79.400
Black Percent 8,395 30.598 29.404 0.400 94.900
Hispanic Percent 8,395 28.479 20.235 3.400 97.900
White Percent 8,395 27.340 26.339 0.000 89.300
Sale Price 8,395 524,822.600 437,943.700 10,040 2,997,500
Census Median Age 8,395 37.945 6.648 10.600 63.900
Percent Occupied Housing Units 8,395 0.908 0.076 0.395 0.995
Census Percent White 8,395 0.552 0.324 0.001 1.000
Census Percent Black 8,395 0.242 0.318 0.000 0.961
Census Percent Asian 8,395 0.101 0.125 0.000 0.878
Notes: 2010 census, 2010-2011 school data, and 2011-2012 property sales data used.
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Table 7: D School Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Standardized English Test Score 1,082 0.037 0.455 −1.118 0.806
Standardized Math Test Score 1,082 −0.111 0.478 −1.382 0.631
English Language Learners Percent 1,082 11.532 7.631 2.800 57.700
Special Education Percent 1,082 16.502 4.416 8.300 30.100
Asian Percent 1,082 9.819 10.397 0.000 35.500
Black Percent 1,082 39.314 33.299 0.500 93.400
Hispanic Percent 1,082 32.142 23.035 5.400 96.600
White Percent 1,082 17.219 23.092 0.000 75.100
Sale Price 1,082 362,241.300 216,220.300 11,000 2,700,000
Census Median Age 1,082 37.032 5.192 24.600 51.100
Percent Occupied Housing Units 1,082 0.920 0.042 0.756 0.986
Census Percent White 1,082 0.385 0.310 0.014 0.962
Census Percent Black 1,082 0.398 0.347 0.002 0.943
Census Percent Asian 1,082 0.081 0.085 0.000 0.422
Notes: 2010 census, 2010-2011 school data, and 2011-2012 property sales data used
Table 8: F School Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Standardized English Test Score 240 −0.089 0.351 −0.950 0.221
Standardized Math Test Score 240 −0.324 0.336 −0.980 −0.002
English Language Learners Percent 240 8.823 3.756 3.300 20.600
Special Education Percent 240 15.408 4.935 9.300 26.900
Asian Percent 240 2.646 1.524 0.300 6.800
Black Percent 240 48.448 26.349 17.900 88.900
Hispanic Percent 240 34.975 16.866 6.400 79.400
White Percent 240 12.122 11.227 0.300 23.700
Sale Price 240 683,171.100 553,035.400 20,000 2,935,000
Census Median Age 240 39.678 5.816 27.800 52.500
Percent Occupied Housing Units 240 0.931 0.025 0.858 0.979
Census Percent White 240 0.436 0.323 0.014 0.919
Census Percent Black 240 0.421 0.336 0.012 0.930
Census Percent Asian 240 0.045 0.031 0.002 0.111
Notes: 2010 census, 2010-2011 school data, and 2011-2012 property sales data used
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Table 9: Hedonic Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Test Scores 2009-2014
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price
Linear Test Score Test Score Squared Quartile Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
‘Test Score‘ 0.077∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.017)
‘Test Scoreˆ 2‘ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002)
Quartile2 0.005
(0.005)
Quartile3 0.024∗∗∗
(0.005)
Quartile4 0.142∗∗∗
(0.006)
BoroughBX −0.243∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
BoroughMN 0.684∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
BoroughQN −0.177∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
BoroughSI −0.492∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
‘Percentage Occupied Housing Units‘ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
‘Percentage White‘ 1.029∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
‘Percentage Black‘ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
‘Percentage Asian‘ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
N 157,197 157,197 157,197
R2 0.412 0.412 0.412
Adjusted R2 0.412 0.412 0.412
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 10: Hedonic Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Accountability Grades 2009-2014
Sale Price
All Years
GradeB −0.033∗∗∗
(0.005)
GradeC −0.035∗∗∗
(0.007)
GradeD −0.066∗∗∗
(0.011)
GradeF −0.079∗∗∗
(0.019)
N 158,410
R2 0.409
Adjusted R2 0.409
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 11: Hedonic Regression Results Grades Along each year
Sale Price
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GradeB −0.037∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.161∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
GradeC −0.221∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.233∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
GradeD 0.096 −0.006 −0.469∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026)
GradeF 0.037 −0.223∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.045) (0.042) (0.036)
N 30,493 27,072 29,771 34,221 36,853
R2 0.414 0.403 0.419 0.414 0.434
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.402 0.418 0.414 0.434
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 12: Hedonic Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Test Scores and Accountability Grades 2009-
2014 Grades
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price
Linear Test Score Test Score Squared Quartile Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
GradeB −0.014∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GradeC 0.002 −0.001 −0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
GradeD −0.008 −0.021∗ −0.040∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
GradeF 0.015 −0.011 −0.033∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
‘Test Score‘ 0.085∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.018)
‘Test Scoreˆ 2‘ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.002)
Quartile2 0.009∗
(0.005)
Quartile3 0.028∗∗∗
(0.005)
Quartile4 0.151∗∗∗
(0.006)
N 157,197 157,197 157,197
R2 0.412 0.413 0.412
Adjusted R2 0.412 0.412 0.412
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 13: Hedonic Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Test Scores and Accountability Grades Along
Each Year
Sale Price
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GradeB −0.031∗∗ −0.020 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
GradeC −0.204∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.235∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.040) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
GradeD 0.114 −0.010 −0.468∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.043
(0.118) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026)
GradeF 0.052 −0.192∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ 0.067∗
(0.132) (0.045) (0.042) (0.037)
‘Test Score‘ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
N 29,880 26,472 29,771 34,221 36,853
R2 0.411 0.411 0.426 0.424 0.442
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.410 0.425 0.423 0.441
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 14: BDD Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Test Scores 2009-2014
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price
.1 miles from boundary .05 miles from boundary .025 miles from boundary
(1) (2) (3)
‘Test Score‘ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
BoroughBX −0.228∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.018)
BoroughMN 0.698∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
BoroughQN −0.190∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
BoroughSI −0.504∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗ −0.619∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.021)
‘Percentage Occupied Housing Units‘ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.040
(0.031) (0.043) (0.055)
‘Percentage White‘ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.036) (0.052)
‘Percentage Black‘ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.033) (0.048)
‘Percentage Asian‘ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.036) (0.053)
N 92,010 48,533 22,508
R2 0.410 0.400 0.398
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.399 0.397
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 15: BDD Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Accountability Grades 2009-2014
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price
.1 miles from boundary .05 miles from boundary .025 miles from boundary
(1) (2) (3)
GradeB −0.020∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.020
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
GradeC −0.017∗ −0.003 −0.033
(0.010) (0.014) (0.020)
GradeD −0.043∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.031
(0.015) (0.021) (0.031)
GradeF −0.102∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.031) (0.045)
N 92,822 48,932 22,700
R2 0.407 0.395 0.393
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.394 0.392
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 16: BDD Regression Results Along each year .025 miles from Boundary
Sale Price
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GradeB 0.021 0.014 −0.130∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.045
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034) (0.033)
GradeC −0.251∗∗ 0.015 −0.228∗∗∗ −0.082 −0.089∗
(0.109) (0.055) (0.058) (0.054) (0.054)
GradeD 0.455 0.027 −0.420∗∗∗ −0.087 −0.069
(0.332) (0.083) (0.088) (0.081) (0.075)
GradeF 0.282 −0.364∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.114) (0.104) (0.103)
N 4,134 3,949 4,313 5,051 5,253
R2 0.396 0.399 0.411 0.405 0.415
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.392 0.404 0.400 0.410
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 17: BDD Regression Estimates of Property Prices on Test Scores and Accountability Grades 2009-2014
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price
.1 miles from boundary .05 miles from boundary .025 miles from boundary
(1) (2) (3)
GradeB 0.003 0.018∗ 0.0002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.014)
GradeC 0.029∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.010) (0.014) (0.021)
GradeD 0.023 0.052∗∗ 0.032
(0.015) (0.022) (0.032)
GradeF 0.005 0.016 −0.135∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.032) (0.046)
‘Test Score‘ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
N 92,010 48,533 22,508
R2 0.411 0.400 0.399
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.400 0.398
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 18: BDD Regression Results Test Scores Along each year .025 miles from Boundary
Sale Price
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GradeB 0.017 0.017 −0.114∗∗∗ −0.051 0.022
(0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033)
GradeC −0.255∗∗ 0.023 −0.212∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.022
(0.108) (0.055) (0.058) (0.054) (0.054)
GradeD 0.444 0.016 −0.383∗∗∗ −0.028 0.018
(0.330) (0.082) (0.087) (0.080) (0.075)
GradeF 0.291 −0.294∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.101
(0.235) (0.113) (0.103) (0.106)
‘Test Score‘ 0.018 0.068∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
N 4,042 3,849 4,313 5,051 5,253
R2 0.396 0.414 0.419 0.415 0.425
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.406 0.412 0.409 0.419
Notes: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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